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SCU.RENT LEGISLATION
TORT ACTIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES.-At common law no tort
action whatsoever was allowed between husband and wife. There
were two theories as to the basis of this rule: (1) the merger of the
personality of the wife in that of the husband; (2) the public policy
theory.' Although the rule was sometimes put on one ground and
sometimes on the other, it is probable that both were equally important.
In 1848 2 and 1849 ' the New York Legislature passed two acts
preserving to married women their real and personal property. The
years 1860 4 and 1862 r saw the passage of additional acts giving to
them the right to bring an action for injuries to person or character.
The passage of these acts put married women on a par with their
husbands insofar as the right to sue third parties for torts was con-
cerned. As between the spouses it might seem that the language of
the acts would permit the same latitude as was allowed towards third
parties, but the New York courts have not gone so far as to adopt
this view. They have allowed actions between spouses for torts to
property 6 although refusing to allow them to sue each other for per-
sonal torts.7 The reason that the courts have given for refusing to
allow such actions is that they are contrary to the public policy of
the state.8
I BuDicK, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1926) 151, citing the following
cases: Phillips v. Quarnet, 1 Q. B. D. 435, 45 L. J. Q. B. 277 (1876) ; Abbott
v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. R. 27 (1877); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich.
80, 75 N. W. 287, 40 L. R. A. 757 (1898) ; Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427,
107 N. W. 1047, 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 191 (1906). It will be noted that none of
these are New York cases and that all were decided after the passage of the
Married Women's Acts in New York. They are, however, declaratory of the
common-law rule in New York prior to the passage of the Married Women's
Acts.
'Laws of 1848, c. 200.
'Laws of 1849, c. 375.
'Laws of 1860, c. 90, § 7.
'Laws of 1862, c. 272. The Acts of 1860 and 1862 were repealed in 1880
(Laws of 1880, c. 245, §§ 36, 38) but the right of a married woman to sue for
torts to person, property or character was preserved to her under the Code of
Civil Procedure, § 450. This right was reinserted in the Domestic Relations
Law of 1896 and was continued in the present law (passed in 1909) in almost
identical language.
'Whitney v. Whitney, 49 Barb. 319 (N. Y. 1867) ; Minier v. Minier, 4 Lans.
421 (N. Y. 1871); Berdell v. Parkhurst, 19 Hun 358 (N. Y. 1879); Fitch v.
Rathbun, 61 N. Y. 579 (1875); Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575 (1881); Ryerson
v. Ryerson, 8 N. Y. Supp. 738 (1890); Mason v. Mason, 66 Hun 386 (1892).
'Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N. Y. 1863); Freethy v.
Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N. Y. 1865); Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882);
Abbe v. Abbe, 22 App. Div. 483, 48 N. Y. Supp. 25 (1897).8In Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N. Y. 1863), the court said:
"The right to sue her husband in an action of assault and battery may
perhaps be covered under the literal language of this section; but I think
such was not the meaning and intent of the legislature and such should
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The refusal to allow these actions has led to some very interesting
decisions in recent years. In Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co.,9 the
Court of Appeals allowed a married woman to recover for personal
injuries from the defendant corporation. The corporation was held
liable for the negligence of its servant, the plaintiff's husband, al-
though the husband himself was not liable. Not long after this de-
cision the Appellate Division, Third Department, in the case of Wads-
worth v. Webster ' 0 refused to allow a wife to recover from a part-
nership of which her husband, whose negligence had caused her in-
juries, was a member. It was not, however, until the case of Caplan
v. Caplan "- came up that the Court of Appeals was asked to review
the situation with regard to partnerships. In this case the husband
was clearly acting in the partnership business and the question was
squarely presented as to whether the partnership was liable although
the negligent partner was not. The court decided that it was not,
thus definitely settlitig the question of such liability.
Although the New York courts had thus limited the right of
married women to sue for torts, there were a number of other juris-
dictions 12 which allowed such actions between spouses, either by a
liberal interpretation of a general statutory provision or by expressly
providing for such actions. Finally, in 1937, the New York State
Legislature, taking cognizance, perhaps, of the great increase in the
number of injuries suffered by women through the negligence of their
husbands, since the advent and widespread use of automobiles, took
the step necessary to alleviate the hardships so often caused by the
application of this now obsolete rule of public policy. 13 It amended
not be the construction given to the act, for the following among other
reasons: * * *2. It is contrary to the policy of the law, and destructive
of that conjugal union and tranquillity, which it has always been the
object of the law to guard and protect. * * * 3. The effect of giving so
broad a construction to the Act of 1860 might be to involve the husband
and wife in perpetual controversy and litigation-to sow the seeds of
perpetual domestic discord and broil-to produce the most discordant and
conflicting interests of property between them, and to offer a bounty or
temptation to the wife to seek encroachment upon her husband's property,
which would not only be at war with domestic peace, but deprive her
probably of those testamentary dispositions by the husband, in her favor,
which he would otherwise be likely to make."
'249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1928).
" 143 Misc. 806, 257 N. Y. Supp. 386 (1932). The plaintiff in this action
did not have a very strong case since she had failed to show that at the time of
the accident her husband was acting in the partnership business. For this
reason, the case was never taken to the Court of Appeals.
"268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1935).
"-Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917) ; Fitzpatrick v. Owens,
124 Ark. 167, 186 S. W. 832 (1916); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At. 89(1914) ; Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915) ; Roberts v. Roberts,
185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923) ; Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac.
1022 (1914).
'The author does not mean to infer by this statement that human nature
has changed so greatly as to preclude the possibility of family quarrels with
their attendant unpleasantries.
1937]
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Section 57 of the Domestic Relations Law 14 by expressly providing
that married women may sue, or be sued by, their husbands for any
wrongful or tortious act resulting in injury to person, property or
character. 15
The far-reaching results of this legislative enactment will readily
be seen. Practically all of the New York cases previously cited in
this article are no longer law.16 Not only are husbands and wives no
longer immune from suits by their spouses for personal torts, but also
any partnership of which one spouse may be a member is now liable
for all injuries inflicted in the course of the partnership business. We
may confidently expect quite a number of actions in a short time,
under the provisions of this law.
Since husbands and wives may now sue each other for personal
injuries, the new law is capable of greatly increasing the burden of
insurance carriers. Having issued policies before it was possible for
one spouse to bring an action against the other, the insurance com-
panies would have thrust upon them a liability which was not con-
templated when they entered into these contracts unless they were
otherwise protected. To prevent this injustice and maintain the status
quo (as far as the underwriters' liability is concerned), the legislature
inserted in the new law three sections 17 which provide that unless the
policy makes express provision for it, such liability shall not be deemed
to be included within the terms of the policy. The effect of these
sections is to neutralize the additional burden imposed upon the under-
writers by the change in the Domestic Relations Law.
However, in their effort to protect the insurance companies, the
legislators seem to have gone a little too far. The second paragraph
of Section 2 of the Act reads as follows:
" N. Y. Consolidated Laws, c. 14.
' Laws of 1937, c. 669, § 1, in effect Sept. 1, 1937. The section as amended,
reads as follows:
"A married woman has a right of action for an injury to her person,
property or character or for an injury arising out of the marital rela-
tion, as if unmarried. She is liable for her wrongful or tortious acts;
her husband is not liable for such acts unless they were done by his
actual coercion or instigation; and such coercion or instigation shall not
be presumed, but must be proved. A married woman has a right of
action against her husband for his wrongful or tortious acts resulting to
her in any personal injury as defined in section thirty-seven-a of the
general construction law, or resulting in injury to her property, as if they
were unmarried, and she is liable to her husband for her wrongful or
tortious acts resulting in any such personal injury to her husband or to
his property, as if they were unmarried.
Section 5 of the Act provides that:
"The amendment made by this act to section fifty-seven of the domestic
relations law shall not affect any right, cause of action or defense existing
prior to the taking effect of this act."
"This amendment, however, will have no effect on the law as stated in
the Schubert case, cited supra, note 9.
"Laws of 1937, c. 669, §§ 2, 3, 4.
[ VOL. 12
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"No such policy, however, heretofore or hereafter issued shall
be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured for in-
juries to his or her spouse, or for injury to property of his or
her spouse unless express provision for such insurance is in-
cluded in the policy." (Italics ours.)
It is submitted that this section, in part, contravenes Article I,
Section 10 of the Constitution.' 8 Since, even prior to this enactment,
husbands and wives could sue each other for injuries to property,"9
an undenvriter who has issued a policy insuring against liability for
injury to property must be held to have contemplated liability for such
injuries between spouses. Therefore a statute which declares that no
policy heretofore issued shall be deemed to insure against such lia-
bility is clearly impairing the obligation of contracts and to that extent
is unconstitutional. 20
Although the new amendment to the Domestic Relations Law
may have the undesirable effect of bringing family disputes into the
courts for settlement,21 it would seem that the benefits which will be
derived from it will more than offset this defect and make the change,
on the whole, a highly desirable one.
EDWARD J. CARRY.
AN AMENDMENT TO THE MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW IN REF-
ERENCE TO ALTERATIONS OF SLUM DWELLINGS.-Many persons in
the lower-income groups of our population ' have been compelled, for
many years, to live in buildings that have long been outmoded by both
law and time. Faced by this problem, the New York Housing
Authority was created in an attempt to eradicate these eyesores of
the city.2 Investigations were conducted by this body and the testi-
2U. S. CoxST. Art. I, § 10 (1) reads as follows:
"No State shall * * * pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."
"See cases cited supra, note 6.
o We are of the opinion that it was unnecessary for the legislature to refer
at all to contracts heretofore made. Section 5 of the Act, supra, note 15, would
render futile any attempt on the part of an insured's injured spouse to force
liability on the insurer for personal injuries under Section 1.
I See quotation from Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N. Y.
1863), cited supra, note 8.
'New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E.(2d) 151 (1936).Karlin, New York Slum Clearance and tte Law (1937) 52 POL. Sci.
Q. 245 ("the purpose of the Municipal Housing Authorities Law [enacted by
the Laws of 1934, c. 4, as an amendment to the Housing Law of 1926] is to
enable cities in New York State to take necessary steps to clear slums and to
provide housing accommodations for persons of low income * * *").
1937]
